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Poasa v. State, 135 Nev. Adv. Op. 57 (Nov. 27, 2019)1
CRIMINAL LAW: PRESENTENCE CONFINEMENT
Summary
The Court reaffirmed its holding in Kuykendall v. State, interpreting NRS 176.055(1) to
require sentencing courts to award credit for time served in presentence confinement.2
Background
The State charged Uputaua Diana Posasa with the felony of grand larceny of an
automobile, and the gross misdemeanor of the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. Posada
pleaded guilty to both counts, pursuant to a plea agreement.
Following the entry of Poasa’s plea, she was released on her own recognizance.
Subsequently, she failed to appear at sentencing and was ultimately extradited back to Washoe
County and placed in custody prior to sentencing.
At sentencing, the State recommended twelve to thirty months in prison. Alternatively,
the State argued that if the district court should decide to give Poasa probation, it should forfeit
Poasa’s ninety-nine days’ credit for time served and order her to serve an additional ninety days
in jail.
The district court sentenced Poasa to a suspended sentence of twelve to thirty-four
months and placed her on probation. The court forfeited Poasa’s ninety-nine days’ credit for time
served in jail while awaiting sentencing.
Discussion
The Court has interpreted NRS 176.055(1) to mandate credit for time served. NRS
176.055(1) states, in relevant part, that “whenever a sentence of imprisonment in the county jail
or state prison is imposed, the court may order that credit be allowed against the duration of the
sentence . . . for the amount of time which the defendant has actually spent in confinement before
conviction.” In Kuykendall v. State, the Court held that though the word “may” implies
discretion, NRS 176.055(1) mandates credit for time served before sentencing because that was
the legislative purpose of the statute.3 Following its decision in Kuykendall, the Court has
repeatedly held that NRS 176.055(1) requires sentencing courts to award credit for time served
in presentence confinement.4
While the State urged the Court to overrule Kuykendall, the Court noted that under the
doctrine of stare decisis, it will not overturn precedent without a compelling reason to do so.5
Here, the Court had no disagreement with Kuykendall and did not find the decision to be clearly
erroneous. Instead, the Court found that the reasoning in Kuykendall is consistent with its general
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rule of statutory construction that the word “may” will be construed as permissive unless a
different construction is required in order to carry out the clear intent of the Legislature.6 In
Kuykendall, the Court determined that the statute’s clear intent required that the word “may” be
construed as imposing a mandate.7
The Legislature has not acted in disagreement with the Court’s interpretation of NRS
176.055(1). The Court noted that in the 23 years since Kuykendall was decided, the Legislature
has not changed the language that the Court interpreted as mandatory. In that time, the
Legislature has amended other aspects of the statute while remaining silent on the Court’s
construction of the word “may,” implying that the Legislature approved the Court’s
interpretation. Further, the Court’s construction of the word “may” to be mandatory is
fundamentally fair, prevents arbitrary application of the statute, and avoids constitutional
concerns of discrimination based on indigent status.
Conclusion
The Court held that there was no compelling reason to overturn its holding in Kuykendall,
and it remanded the case to the district court to amend the judgment of conviction to give Poasa
credit for time served in presentence confinement.
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